apparently presents to the other a threat of instability and the potential for dissolution. This paper will attempt to substantiate the claims that this republican moment must be recalled from the fit of absence of mind in which historians have lost it; that the competitive claims of republics and empires are central to early-modern political discourse;8 and that the intellectual history of Britain must attend to the languages of empire as keenly as to the words of republicanism which have effectively drowned them out.
If, as Caroline Robbins noted. 'There cannot be discerned a typical republican imperial ideology',9 this may be because no self-reflecting earlymodern empire could accommodate unthreatened a republican ideology, nor could a republic endow itself with an imperial identity without danger to the independent authority of its citizenry.1" However, the search for typicality itself is as chimerical and misleading as the wider quest for stable concepts in political discourse. Rather, one should seek moments of argument as the context for utterances; an intellectual history of the British empire, for example, would thus become a narrative history of usage in time. My argument will attempt to illuminate one scene in that narrative, with the light provided by the aetiological recourse made to the republican moment by the 'patriot' opposition to Walpole, and by the ideological uses found for the legacy of that moment during another crisis within greater Britain in the I770s, when the nascent republican empire of the United States dissociated itself from the domineering imperial republic of the United Kingdom.1" Yet, if the crown's British empire had been defined as a stable and defensive unit, it was apparent from Neptune's exhortation that gaining ' new acquests' was a viable alternative to hereditary maintenance. This was not merely a poetaster's idle epigram. The English crown had been slow to take up the imperial gauntlet and had proceeded by colonies planted under charter by private individuals and companies. The Navigation Ordinance of I65I tied Britain and its overseas possessions for the first time into a single transatlantic trading unit, as allegiance to the crown had been dissolved, and the central government disencumbered of dynastic and historic obligations. The turn to a non-dynastic foreign policy, which could repudiate past alliances and be propelled by economic or religious motives, left the commonwealth and Protectorate open to take an aggressive attitude towards the dominions of competing powers. In November I653, a few months before the Treaty of Westminster which ended the First Dutch War, Anthony Nicholl wrote from Cornwall to Colonel Robert Bennet who was then sitting as a member of the Nominated Assembly in London, 'you Cannott ymagine what great satisfaction itt gives generally to the Country the very discourse of a peace with the Hollander: an absolute settlement with that nation will be of great advantage to this common wealth; for amity with that people would make those two common wealths intire masters of the whole ocean; and you might soe dispose of the trade of the whole world, as you please and where you please ... ytt twere easily to be demonstrated how that the whole profitte of the kings of Spaynes West Indys might be broughte to England and Holland ... The advantages are apparent every way'."7 There was indeed great rejoicing at the news of the peace with Holland when it was proclaimed in April 1654, and though the Venetian secretary noted that Cromwell did not personally benefit, the Protector nevertheless 'considered his position strengthened by this treaty, and it is reported he will now assume another title and ... style himself Emperor of Great Britain'. 18 Anthony Nicholl proved a better guide than Lorenzo Paulucci to the options which the Anglo-Dutch peace had provided for Cromwell. The amphibious force which had sailed from Portsmouth late in December I654 was one arm of a double movement against the Spanish, for in October another fleet, under the command of Admiral Blake, had been sent to the Mediterranean to harass Spanish shipping in home waters.29 Yet, hastily equipped, and divided in its command, the western fleet under Penn and Venables was to have far less success in its aims, despite the greater hopes that were being placed in it. Though its exact destination was a secret, even to most of those aboard, it had been so long in the making that the design was 'Vulgarly discovered', and rumours had circulated as early as the previous May that its destination was to be Spanish America.30 Gilbert Burnet reported long after that 'all were in a gaze whither it was to go: some fancied it was to rob the church of Loretto, which did occasion a fortification to be drawn around it: others talked of Rome itself; for Cromwell's preachers had this often in their mouths, that if it were not for the divisions at home, he would go and sack Babylon...'. No official acknowledgement was made of these plans at home, and 'All he said upon it was, that he sent out the fleet to guard the seas, and restore England to its dominion on that element'.31 Thus, if Burnet is to be believed, Cromwell's purported aim was the defence of the Seldenian British imperium, rather than the expansion of a British empire.
After stopping to pick up some raggle-taggle reinforcements on Barbados in January I655, the fleet continued westward until it reached Hispaniola in the second week of April.32 During three weeks on the island, two attempts were made upon the capital, San Domingo. Both failed, and disease and enemy attack killed at least a thousand men. Unused to jungle warfare in extreme heat, the undisciplined army collapsed from lack of food and water, and suffered the rigours of dysentery. Nor could the soldiers fight the enemy on equal terms, because Spanish pikes were two feet longer. These problems of materiel were compounded by the uncertainty bred by the cowardice of the soldiers and the divided command (respect for which was weakened by Venables's attentions to his new bride, for whom the voyage to Hispaniola was an inauspicious honeymoon). Though the commissioners had been charged that the expedition might 'make way for the bringing in the light of the Gospell and power of the true Religion and Godliness into those parts', 33 if God were to be pleased to allow it, Venables protested that instead of six ministers of religion for his forces he had been sent six black clerical coats.34 Indeed, the greatest blow for protestantism struck by the forces seems to have been when the 'soldiers brought forth a large statue of the Virgin Mary, well The response at home was not to be so sanguine, despite early confidence inspired by misinformation. On 3 April I655, the wildest hopes of riches and dominion seemed to have been fulfilled in the report that 'the English are become Masters of no less than three and thirty gold and silver mines, which, if true, will doubtless make our English Continent the most flourishing Common-wealth under the Sun. '3 Mercurius Politicus carried various notices from across Europe as news filtered back of the fleet's endeavours. Only in July were these accounts finally proved false.40 When word reached the Protector on 24 July I655, he shut himself alone in his room for a day, and began a long process of self-questioning which was to haunt him to the end of his life.4' As Roger Williams related, long afterwards, 'Oliver, in straights and defeats (especially at Hispaniola) desired all to Speake and declare freely what they thought the mind of God was'.42 Cromwell, until then assured of divine favour and the friendly eye of providence, could not reconcile his defeat with his sanctioned role. The Swedish ambassador remarked that Cromwell's personal sense of failure was said to have put paid to his plan to take sole legislative Ibid exemplary typological narrative through which God's judgement upon his People might be discerned.5' Though the judgements of providence could be assimilated to those offortuna, and imperial Rome was as apt an explanatory paradigm for the Protectorate's failures, the main vehicle for opposition and exculpation during these tense months, was the Old Testament story of the sin of Achan.
When news arrived at Earls Colne that the army had been routed in the Caribbean, Ralph Josselin sanguinely remarked in his diary, 'our mouths ful of a great loss at Hispaniola, perhaps it will make the good news that is coming more acceptable, and must rouse us up as Joshua at Ai'.52 In the English Israel, there had apparently been no actual succession from a Moses leading his people to the promised land to a militant Joshua, taking them in conquest against the surrounding foes. This succession had instead been typological, passing not from one man to another, but rather from the image of Cromwell as prophet to his incarnation as general. Before destroying the city ofJericho, Joshua had warned his people, 'keep yourselves from the accursed thing, lest ye make yourselves accursed, when ye take of the accursed thing, and make the camp of Israel a curse and trouble it'. His injunction was ignored by Achan, as he stole a 'goodly Babylonish garment', silver shekels and a gold wedge, and brought down the wrath of the Lord, who allowed the men of Ai to cow and defeat Joshua's troops, causing them to fly precipitately. As an explanation for the failure at Hispaniola, the story of Achan was distinctly double-edged. While it acknowledged that providence had not censured the design as a whole, or the godliness of its motivation, it implied that some sinful agent had drawn away God's favour: as one defensive pamphlet put it, 'Israel hath sinned, they have medled with the accursed thing: There's the matter. Here was no unlawfulnesse in the design, but unlawfull things done in the managing of it. ... my thoughts tell me it is possible there might be some Achan amongst them'.53 The task, then, was to locate and destroy that Achan if divine favour were to be returned to England under Cromwell, its Joshua.54
Or was he its Achan? None could be sure whether the sin of Achan lodged in the nation as a whole, its governors, or the army in the Indies. Cromwell's confusion is shown by his call for another day of fasting and humiliation issued in March of I656. Still unable to fathom the mystery of God's judgement, Cromwell declared, 'The Lord hath been pleased in a wonderful manner to humble and rebuke Us, in that expedition to the West we apprehend was not in favour of the Enemy, yet gives Us just reason to fear, that We may have either failed in the spirit and manner wherewith this business hath been undertaken, or that the Lord sees some abomination or accursed thing by which he is provoked thus to appear against Us'.55 The inclusiveness of the proclamation, and the Protector's conviction that the need for humilitation 'will undoubtedly be agreed by all', presented the defeat as a national crisis in which the government felt that, just as there was silence in heaven, so there was too much speculation on earth, even to laying the blame on the magistrate himself. realization, should the members, and most of all the Protector, so choose to use the occasion. As J. G. A. Pocock puts it, 'Harrington's ideal moment is all but immediately present; the whole point of the fiction is that it meant to assert that England/Oceana and Cromwell/Olphaus stand at a point in time at which the ideal work of legislation can actually be performed'. 73 Though Pocock has also observed that 'Oceana can have played no part in the parliamentary elections', 4 it may be rather that any link between parliament and publication runs in the opposite direction, with that ideal legislative moment not 'all but', but infact, present. Harrington's admission that the Oceana was 'but a rough draught, for I have not been yet two years about it, nor ever saw all or halfe my Papers together'75 implies that its inspiration may have been more immediate than the death of Charles (the 'Preliminaries', at least, can date from no earlier than the summer of I656, since they contain allusions to works published in June of that year),76 and that it was composed sectionally rather than linearly, and so was subject to dispersal and revision. The confusing textual states of the first editions seem to confirm such a speculation. In both of the editions of Oceana produced in I656, the pagination runs regularly up to page 239, then the verso of 239 is blank before pagination begins again on 255 
